The Senior Scientists    

 Iran’s Secret Nuclear Weapens program

Abbas Rashidi

Dear visitors,
One of the most important players in Iran’s nuclear industry is Kalaye Electric, which also appears on the list of bodies on whom sanctions were imposed under Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747. The company is included on this list because of its involvement in Iran’s nuclear program, especially in building the enrichment disposition. As part of this, Kalaye Electric is carrying out extensive procurement of dual-purpose equipment, raw materials, and advanced machinery, using brokering companies and cover names, in order to conceal the identity of the Iranian end-user.
Kalaye Electric – which is located in Tehran and has since 1995 been the main R&D body for centrifuge technology and in charge of the industrial production site – has succeeded in gradually setting up an industrial disposition for uranium enrichment. This disposition began as an experimental infrastructure feeding gas through a vacuum in a handful of centrifuges, and later ran dozens of centrifuges in a pilot project, in which UF6 gas was enriched to a concentration of 4%. In April 2007, Iran’s president, Ahmedinejad, announced that Iran had established an industrial disposition with 1300 centrifuges deployed in 164 cascades, in an underground uranium enrichment facility in Natanz.
A year earlier, Ahmedinejad had stated that “Iran also has P2 centrifuges with four times more production capacity and they are currently in the R&D stage”. The new centrifuges are more efficient than the P1 centrifuge currently being used, with a faster separation capability. For Iran, running the advanced centrifuges is a priority whose achievement will lead to industrial production of the advanced model, in order to enrich uranium for Iran’s military nuclear program.
There is no doubt that Kalaye Electric is a key factor in the advances Iran has achieved in developing centrifuges and constructing the infrastructure needed to run them.
One of the members of Kalaye Electric’s BOG is Abbas Rashidi, an electrical engineer by training, in charge of running the enrichment disposition. In August 2006, Rashidi received a special commendation from President Ahmedinejad for his leading role and noteworthy dedication to successfully running the enrichment cascades at Natanz. Given his critical role in the enrichment process, sanctions, including travel restrictions and freezing of assets, were imposed on Rashidi under Security Council Resolution 1803, as they were on many Iranian figures and organizations whichwe have exposed on our blog.
As those who love Iran and care about its future and security, it is our duty, given the confrontational and threatening nature of the regime, to expose Rashidi, who is working under the surface, both literally and figuratively, and others at Kalaye Electric. To this end, we need your help with any information you may have on Rashidi, Kalaye Electric, and anyone contributing to Iran’s efforts to arm itself with non-conventional weapons

Dr. Amir Hossein Feghhi

Dear visitors,

Today we will reveal new information about a senior scientist, with an important job, who is involved in Iran’s secret nuclear activity. Most of us do not know him, or have even heard of him, because of his seniority and the secrecy surrounding his work.

The person we would like to tell you about is called Dr. Amir Hossein Feghhi.
This scientist worked at the Institute for Applied Physics (IAP), in the Readiness Center, from 2003. This body is subordinate to the Defense Ministry, which has contributed and continues to contribute significantly to Iran’s nuclear project, and is connected to the Modern Defensive Readiness and Technology Center (MDRTC), used by the Defense Ministry to carry our secret nuclear activities that have been transferred from other sites (such as the Lavizan site).

Dr. Feghhi is a physicist employed as a researcher at the physics department of Amir Kabir University of Technology. This is one of the universities that produces the country’s leading scientific minds, but unfortunately it is also a hothouse for scientists helping the regime in its criminal efforts to achieve weapons of mass destruction.

Feghhi is involved in developing advanced applied technologies and is considered Iran’s leading expert on neutronics calculations. Feghhi has rich experience in the field, and participates in many projects. Most of his research focuses on his work at the PMPRC on neutronics calculations in researching various plasma systems. The PMPRC is a small physics and technological developments laboratory, which has been expanded to become a scientific methods research and development center.

You didn’t think we would forget to give you some spicy information about him, did you?

Our friend Feghhi is considered a very dominant and successful figure, but this is all at the expense of his friends and work colleagues. He knows how to advance his own interests while leaving his friends far behind. For this he uses his considerable funds (we wonder where they came from…) to finance visits to high-class restaurants, gifts, trips, and other benefits for people whom he favors…

If you ask the people around him what sort of a person he is, they will all tell you that he is an opportunist, proud, and lazy. In order to take part in a project Feghhi demands a junior doctoral student to act as his assistant and do all the hard work for him. But when the credit is being claimed, Feghhi knows how to take it all for himself.

Feghhi, like many other of his scientist friends involved and assisting in developing Iran’s nuclear program, learned and trained in advanced and developed Western countries. In 2006, Feghhi underwent two months’ training at CERN, France. In July 2007, he was scheduled to begin his post-doctorate studies in France, on the high power hydron beam.
Dear readers,

It is clear to all of us what damage it may do to Iran’s academic future and its scientists, mixing pure science and academic research with developing weapons of mass destruction. The example we have shown you today is one of many that show a corrupt and selfish scientist who has sold his soul to the devil to advance his own interests.

Over the last few days, there have been many messages to us with important information for our efforts. We are carefully checking the reliability of the information, and will make sure to publish it for our other readers as soon as possible.

Keep sendng us information and helping the important struggle for the future of our beloved nation.

Asghar Molaei Dehkord

Asghar Molaei Dehkordi – A Scientist Serving the Secret Nuclear Program

Several weeks ago, we exposed Dr. Hossein Feghhi, a senior scientist involved in Iran’s secret nuclear activity.

This exposure prompted many reactions and new revelations about other scientists who have “sold their soul to the devil” and are taking part in the regime’s mad race to achieve nuclear weapons, while bypassing international safeguards of Iran’s nuclear program, and deceiving the IAEA, which is in charge of these safeguards.

One of these scientists, whom some of you may know, is a senior lecturer at the chemical engineering faculty of Sharif University of Technology, called Prof. Asghar Molaei Dehkordi.

Prof. Dehkordi’s principal areas of academic expertise, in which he completed his doctorate at Amirkabir University are:

Uranium: Separating uranium from solutions received by dissolving it at the quarry or purification at the plant.
Biotechnology: Use of characteristics of a membrane separating two liquid phases to speed up reactions using catalysts and separating products by liquid-liquid extraction.
Prof. Dehkordi is a hard-working and productive scientist, who has published several articles, including:

Oxidative desulfurization of simulated light fuel oil and untreated kerosene Fuel Processing Technology, In Press, Corrected Proof, Available online 19 December 2008.
Asghar Molaei Dehkordi, Zahra Kiaei, Mohammad Amin Sobati.
Investigation of a two impinging-jets contacting device for liquid-liquid extraction processes.
Chemical Engineering Science, Volume 61, Issue 12, June 2006, pp 3942-3950.
Javad Saien, S. Alireza Ebrahimzadeh Zonouzian, Asghar Molaei Dehkordi.
A novel two-impinging-jets reactor for copper extractions and stripping processes.
Chemical Engineering Science, Volume 87, Issue 2, 28 June 2002, pp 227-238.
Asghar Molaei Dehkordi.
Application of a novel-opposed-jets contacting device in liquid-liquid extraction.
Chemical Engineering Science, Volume 41, Issue 3, March 2002, pp 251-258.
Asghar Molaei Dehkordi.
Along with his academic work, Prof. Dehkordi is involved in developing the secret nuclear program, including at the Physics Research Center (PHRC), where he worked on producing “yellow cake”, which is a major stage in producing a nuclear weapon.

In addition, Dehkordi worked at Kimia Madan Natanz (KMN), which was involved in Iran’s secret military nuclear program, including direct involvement in uranium quarrying, extraction, conversion, and centrifuge enrichment.

Specifically, because this is a serious and renowned scientist, who has taught many students, the damage to Iran’s scientific and academic community is so much the greater!

Prof. Dehkordi, similar to other scientists who have chosen of their own free will or because of constraints to help Iran arm itself with nuclear weapons, is shooting himself in the foot, and undermining, perhaps unwittingly, the strength of Iran's scientific and research education.

The facts – look at Iraq and North Korea – have proven that a country’s national strength is not achieved by investing in developing weapons, conventional or unconventional, but by investing in the economy, culture, education, and science, while establishing relations of cooperation and understanding with the region and internationally.

Do not be part of the regime’s destructive path!

We plan to continue exposing, with the help of our loyal readers, all the scientists who are undermining Iran’s future!

Haleh Bakhtiar

She was born in 1975 in Esfahan to a well-to-do family. Her father is Human Bakhtiar and her mother is Nurani Khojaste. Haleh’s sister, Hangameh, is a root canal specialist dentist.

She spent her childhood in Esfahan, studied English and computers but also indulged in sports such as swimming and gymnastics.

As a girl/teenager she preferred the company of older friends (her fondness for Aghazadeh may be rooted in this preference).
Her ‘official’ husband is Keyhan Shekufan, a veterinarian.

Education
She did her elementary, junior high-school and high-school studies at Esfahan’s Edalat school, and matriculated in Physics-Mathematics.
Her university education includes the following:
- BSc in Chemistry from Sharif University.
- MSc in Chemical Engineering from Tehran University.
Among her professor were Dr. Fathallah Farhadi (her BSc supervisor), Dr. Mohsen Nasser Esfahani and Dr. Abbas’ali Khodadadi (her MSc supervisors).

Main positions (in chronological order)
- Commercial manager in charge of raw material acquisition at the Zirconium project.
- Magnesium production manager at the zirconium company.
- Research and development manager at the Zirconium company.
- Deputy Director for quality control, and member of the Zirconium company board.
- Member of the board, the Iranian centrifuge technology company.
- Technical deputy and board member of the Iranian company for acquiring nuclear industry technologies.
- Current position - CEO and deputy chairman of ESNICO company (for acquiring nuclear technology).
- She is also a board member of a parent company of a company specializing in producing raw materials and nuclear fuel.

Awards and prizes or boycott and punishment
Haleh Bakhtiar received from President Ahmadi-Nejad a Class-3 award for research on magnesium production 99/99. She was blacklisted by the UN Security Council for the same research

Hossein Hosseini

Hosseini is currently director of MESNA, which is in charge of setting up the IR360 reactor. He is a senior AEOI official who was imposed from above after heading the IR 40 project (the nuclear reactor in Arak) until mid 2007. He was appointed project director of the IR-40 reactor after his predecessor failed to advance the project.
If that was the reason for replacing the previous project director, then why did they specifically appoint Hosseini? He is, after all, an engineer who was not familiar with the professional details of the project, and was therefore not a professional authority.
Several companies were involved in the IR-40 project over the years. One example is Modern Industries Technique (MITEC), an Iranian company which is the chief project manager for the IR-40 reactor. This is a private company, which replaced ENTC in the IR-40 project, liaising with Russia’s SSL.
Another company which was also involved in the construction project at the IR-40 site was Tarn O Palayesh Consulting Engineers (TOP), a civil engineering company.
Was this a good choice? Hardly. The company had no previous experience constructing nuclear facilities. It may have been involved in the construction of certain industrial facilities at most.
Who is Hosseini?
He is a wealthy man, indeed most Iranians consider him very rich, with three residences in Tehran. His father has an orchard and a summer-house in Mashhad. In the summer, Hosseini’s family goes there for a month or two (although he usually does not join them).
Hosseini has another source of income – Kavoshyar company, where he works.
As someone under UN Security Council sanctions (Resolution 1803 of March 2008) for nuclear proliferation activity, he should be concerne over the possibility of losing his extensive assets, among other things, because the resolution also stipulates freezing assets. This is in addition to restricting his trips abroad.

Personal Details:
He was born on 22nd November, 1950.
Father’s name: Seyed Ebrahim Hosseini.
Mother’s maiden name: Sahebjan Hosseini.
Hosseini has three adult children: a daughter and two sons.
Hosseini has several brothers. The oldest one works or worked at Tehran University and the youngest one works with computers.
In 2006, Hosseini lived in Tehran, at N. 10, 2 nd Western Alley, Hedayat Street, Daroos, Tehran.
Hosseini is a good example of a senior worker at the AEOI who, in addition to his standing in the organization, also enjoys considerable wealth. His involvement in the nuclear project has endangered not only his assets, but also his freedom, through his inclusion in the Security Council sanctions.

Javad Rahighi

Dear Readers,
The connection between the academic world and Iranian NCW-related activity is especially tight. Hundreds of experts in nuclear, physics, chemistry, electronics, etc. have become the ‘mercenaries’ of the regime in its efforts to obtain illegitimate power.

One of these mercenaries is Professor Javad Rahighi, a professor of physics, an expert in the field of neutrons. He is also the manager of the AEOI’s Nuclear Research Center (NRC), which among its other functions, supervises the UCF (Uranium Conversion Facility). We have elaborated on the UCF and the employees and managers who worked there in the past.

Prof. Rahighi was born in Mashhad on 1st May 1954. He is a graduate of the Tehran University’s Physics Department and has an MA from the University of Edinburgh in Nuclear Instrumentation. He has a doctorate from Edinburgh University in Nuclear Physics/Neutron Physics (Research on Heavy Ion Collision).

From 1986-1991 he was head of the nuclear engineering department at the Nuclear Research Center in Esfahan. From 1998 until the present – he is Professor and head of the Neutron Physics group of the NRC, at the AEOI.

Professor Rahighi is also deputy president and in charge of instruction at the SESAME organization – Synchroton-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East. This institute includes nuclear scientists in the Middle East, and is granted assistance from the IAEA.

In the past Prof. Rahighi served in a variety of positions at the NRC in Esfahan and at the ENTC’s heavy water reactor. He supervised doctoral students at the Applied Physics Institute in Tehran, and at the Amir Kabir and Sharif Universities.

Prof. Rahighi has published several scientific articles in various publications, and he is also a member of the editorial board of the AEOI’s Science and Technology journal, published in scientific cooperation with the NSI (Nuclear Science Association of Iran). The NSI is a non-profit organization situated at the Shahid Beheshti University’s Nuclear engineering department, but has many branches in Iran. Every MA or higher student of physics or nuclear engineering or similar studies can belong to the NSI for a membership fee. Iranian scientists and foreigners of special high scientific standing can become extraordinary members.

The NSI holds two yearly conferences, and Prof. Rahighi is one of the conference organizers. The conferences are held under the auspices of several elements including: the AEOI, Esfahan University and Azad University. The participants include senior nuclear-related figures in Iran.

As you can see, Prof. Rahighi is a ‘man of many talents’, knowledge and experience who chose to serve and advance the illicit goals of an aggressive and irresponsible regime. Professor Rahighi advanced procurement efforts for equipment and material which are banned for sale because they are dual use, and he exploited his academic ties abroad to build a new particle accelerator.

Because of his involvement and ‘contribution’ to the field of conversion and enrichment, Prof. Rahighi, together with several senior officials and scientists, was ‘privileged’ to be included in the list people on whom the UN Security Council and the EU imposed sanctions.

Prof. Rahighi and his scientist friends who assist the nuclear project are beginning to play a professional and personal price, but they are not the only ones. The professional standing and the international contacts of other Iranian scientists and academic institutes that engage in pure professional-academic research are also being irreversibly damaged.

However, the heaviest price is being paid by us, loyal citizens who are forced daily to suffer the serious implications of the lack of investment in developing the country’s infrastructures. Thus, for example, we have been experiencing power shortages for a long time, which disrupt our daily routine, cause heavy traffic jams and a drastic increase in the number of traffic accidents, etc, etc. The reason, claim the senior officials in charge – “a lack of technological resources!”

We ask you dear readers, if this is indeed the reason why financial and skilled personnel resources are not diverted to dealing with Iran’s acute and burning problems – and the problems with the electricity, are as mentioned, just one example of many – instead of investing them in the development of immoral and destructive weapons that may lead to the ruin of our country?

Majid Kabiri Samani

 we will tell you briefly about a young chemical engineer who works in the AEOI’s Uranium Conversion Facility UCF) – Majid Kabiri Samani, aged 33.

Samani is a graduate of Sharif Univerity.

Here are the names of some of his articles:

“Theoretical study on four wave mixing in a dispersable material and optical phase conjunction in the crystal of Bi12SiO20”, and “Numerical solution of phase conjunction by diffraction gratings in photorefractive crystals”. Samani’s co-authors are M.H. Majlis Ara, from the Teacher Training Univ. (Iran), who also helped Samani write the first article, and M. Behboudnia, Univ. of Mohageg Ardebily (Iran).

Samani’s wife is a personality in her own right. She has a degree in physics.

About 18 months ago, she was interested in going overseas for advanced studies. They both examined the options for studying at several universities abroad.

Would you like to know why the couple did not go abroad to study at the time?

Both of them work in Iran’s nuclear project, and Europe is not prepared to admit them into its territory and facilitate their progress. Possibly this is the reason why they never went abroad to study. There may also be other reasons, which you will hear about later. In any case, Iran’s scientists are not wanted in Europe.

It turns out that Samani has a flaw. He is connected to international terrorists! This may already be known to international elements. This is a point that needs to be examined and monitored. Is it even thinkable that a nuclear scientist has connections with international terrorists, who could exploit his knowledge and his status? !

Just think of the implications

Mansour Sultan Roknizadeh

Dear visitors,

As you know, obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD) involves the investment of huge national resources, including massive procurement from foreign countries and investing billions of riyals from the state budget for realizing this goal. This situation is a sure recipe for corruption and exploiting state money by those responsible for managing the procurement effort.

Today we will introduce you to Dr. Mansour Sultan Roknizadeh, born in 1955, who heads Iran’s procurement representation in Russia on behalf of the Technology Cooperation Office (TCO). The TCO is the Defense Ministry’s procurement body that carries out procurement projects for Iran’s military and defense industries, among them for Iran’s military nuclear program.

Dr. Roknizadeh’s activities as head of the procurement representation in Russia – the most important of Iran’s representations through which much money changes hands – is an example of how the Iran’s corrupt system works, in the name of “national interests”.

Dr. Roknizadeh, who studied mechanical engineering in the U.S. specializing in nuclear engineering, was appointed in 1997 to head the TCO’s procurement representation in Russia. He was involved in all the defense and military procurement deals signed between the two sides, worth billions of dollars, especially for the space, missiles, and military nuclear projects. He was also responsible for locating and sending Russian experts to Iran.

After resigning from his position in late 2000 as the TCO’s official representative, Roknizadeh began a new career as an independent businessman involved in many deals, using his ties in the political and defense-military establishment in Iran and Russia, to make enormous profits and to “cream off the top”. Roknizadeh set up several companies and deals in Russia, and for his illegal business he established straw companies, such as Panda Co. and NTC Co., as a cover for his procurement activities for Iran’s military-nuclear and other WMD projects. Roknizadeh deposited all the money he stole from these deals and his profits from his private business in his bank accounts overseas.

Roknizadeh’s business activities in Russia, including his illegal activities, especially relating to the procurement of dual-use products, were suddenly stopped in late 2004, and he was forced to return to Iran. Probably the Russians too could not tolerate his crooked business methods - paying bribes for circuitous business deals and cheating both his Russian partners and his Iranian masters.

Although he was thrown out of Russia in disgrace, Roknizadeh still has ties with his friends in the TCO and in high places. As we know this man and how the system works in Iran, we are absolutely sure that he continues to enjoy the network of connections he wove for himself in the past decade among the military and security bodies the TCO works for.

The TCO has procured know-how, equipment and technology for Iran’s military and defense industries under guise of legitimate procurement of know-how and new technology in important areas for Iran’s national interests, such as medicine, biology, energy, aviation, industry and engineering. In this way, the TCO’s efforts in prohibited areas are at the expense of Iran’s technological and scientific development, including the civilian areas we mentioned, and compounds Iran’s stagnation because of the international isolation imposed on it because of the regime’s policy of aggression.

Our country now, move than ever, needs advanced know-how and technology, but it is doubtful if we can obtain this and develop cooperation with the top countries in research and development in the areas genuinely needed for Iran’s prosperity when people with vested interests such as Roknizadeh, corrupt systems such as the TCO, and irresponsible leaders such as President Ahmadinejad and his cronies, rule the country.

We would be grateful, dear Readers, if you could send us information about Dr. Roknizadeh’s current positions/businesses a connections in the political and defense systems, or about the TCO’s dirty business, and we will take care of publishing it.
This time we exposed the TCO to you. In the next time we will deal with Pishgam, the PHRC and Kalaye Electric.

Mohsen Doust Mohamadi

Dear Readers,

Many of you are no doubt asking yourselves what motivates us to keep publicizing different scientists, who are involved in various nuclear related projects. Well, these scientists live among you. They may be distant relatives, neighbors, fellow students from the past, or other acquaintances. Your future is in their hands…How?

This is a group of scientists which the regime has instructed to achieve one goal – developing a weapon of mass destruction. However, in most cases, these are not top scientists, and their loyalty to their mission and to the country is not particularly high. Their main motives, as you have seen in our previous reports, are greed, achieving high status within their group’s hierarchy, and personal intrigue.

These scientists endanger themselves, their families, and all those around them, including you. The group itself is already in danger. Do not take these comments lightly.

Dear friends, today we would like to direct your attention to an engineer called Mohsen Doust Mohamadi. Doust Mohamadi was born on 14th April 1979 (1358/01/26). He is married and lives in Tehran. His ethnic origin is from the Caucasus. He has an MA in mechanical engineering (applied design). In addition to Farsi, he speaks English.

Doust Mohamadi is working on the UCF project at the Esfahan nuclear technology center. The work address he usually gives is in Tehran, at the end of Amir Shomali Road – 20th road, Iran’s Uranium Conversion Facilities Company (PO Box 13946).

His professional experience includes: Three years specialization and three years practical work. He is currently employed full time.

Doust Mohamadi is described as a man surrounded by friends from all over the world.

He does not smoke or drink (although between ourselves, all of them do in private). He likes pets. He enjoys sport: soccer and volleyball.

Doust Mohamadi likes Hollywood films and pizza.

What can we say…Iran’s regime has tried to create a generation that does not know the West. In fact, this generation has a better Western education than the one before the revolution, and has firmly grasped the more enlightened Western customs.

Doust Mohamadi does a lot of internet surfing, though modesty prevents us from repeating the persistent rumors of the forbidden sites that he visits.

If you want to contact him, his details are:

Phone number: 8639649.

Cellular phone number: 09123408682.

Mohsen Oftadeh – Serving the Secret Nuclear Program

Given his senior position, Oftadeh is the person who develops the research ideas and makes all the required calculations, but a different group carries out the practical test, although he is in close contact with the groups that carry out the actual tests.

Mr. Oftadeh has published about 14 articles in periodicals and seminar papers. Over the years, he has taken part in numerous conventions in Iran and around the world, attending one or two conventions every year.

February 2001: A convention at Malek Ashtar University on explosives and pyrotechnics. Analysis and comparison of explosive characteristics of 2 and 4 di-nitro amide azol with other common explosives.

He wrote a paper on analysis and tests on some of the new developments in combinations of compound propellants.

Another of his papers was on the topic:

Simple Method for Predicting Detonation Pressure of CHNO Mixed Explosives.

October 2003: Participated in a convention in Guilin, China, called

2003 International Autum Seminar on ropellants, explosives and phrotechnics (IASPEP), Guilin, China, October 15-18, 2003.

Here is a picture from the convention:

August 2005: Participated in a convention in Seoul, South Korea, where he gave a speech on:

The investigation of The Propellant performance of some of the nitroquanidine, azol derivatives and nitroamides compounds as gas generators.

Following is an abstract of the paper:

Determination of the performance and the other properities of an energetic material for military applications is a high dangerous and expensive process. The using of the computer codes and theoretical models in order to investigating and prediction of these properities had been preferred. A gas generating compound includes the fuel source, oxidizer, cooling material, binder, neutralizing compound, fuel supplemental and so on. These components are used for treatment and optimizing combustion and characteristics of the compound. Among these components, the fuel source is very important so as with varing the structure, combustion characteristics and gas products were improved hughly. In this work we investigate many common fuel source such us nitroquanidine, azol derivatives and nitroamides as gas generator and we introduce them as the most performance, the least remained solid product and maximum of the gaseous products. Some of the obtained results of these mentioned compounds using PM3 calculations are listed in the following table.

September 2006: Wrote a paper on:

“Investigation of Explosive performance of Mono-,bi-and-tri-cyclic Nitramines by Semiemperical Methods”.

August 2007: Participated in a convention in Turin, Italy, on:

“Chemistry protecting Health, Natural Environment and Cultural Heritage”.

June 2006: Participated in a convention in Dubrovnik, Croatia, where he presented a paper entitled:

Investigation of Explosive performance of Mono-,bi-and-tri-cyclic nitramines by AB-initio computational methods.

Following is an abstract of the paper:

Cyclic nitramines are members of a great group named “propellants” as energetic materials. RDX and HMX are two of the famous propellants, which employed in rockets and some guns. HMX also applied in implode materials in nuclear fission (1-4). The importance of computational study in this filed relies from their limitations of their dangerous in experimental approach point of view. In our research, three groups of cyclic nitramines including some of one, tow and three cyclic nitramine compounds are investigated. They are designed by substitution of –No2, -F, and –H on their rings. At this study more processes are carried out by AB-initio methods (RHF) and DFT methods (B3LYP) in SCF technique. The basis sets 6-31G** and 6-311++G** have used in calculations. In all of quantum calculations have been used from Gaussian 98 software. Specific impulse has a direct relationship with tow parameters ratio of gas products coefficients per molecular weight, N/M, and heat of detonation, ?? detonation. Fluorine can increase the heat of detonation in Mono-Cyclic nitramines, while the reverse results obtained for Bi- and Tri-Cyclic nitramines. So this matter can be a pleasant situation for synthesize of these compounds as propellants. In unsubstituted nitramines. The results have shown that a good combination of these factors and molecular geometric effects can be as an explosive performance prediction factor. In this studying, the application of the DFT method obtains better results than RHF method, but the basis sets variation is no effect on the results in the two methods.

December 2007: Participated in a convention in T’ai-chung, Taiwan, called:

“The 9th IEEE International Symposium on multimedia”.

We learn from all the papers he has written, of which we have quoted only a few examples, that Mr. Oftadeh is involved in theoretical calculations of “energetic power” generated when explosive material or rocket fuel is detonated. These theoretical methods are applied according to rules of energetic calculations of energies contained in the molecules of the explosive material (rocket fuel), according to the chemical components (chemical atoms) comprising the molecule. These calculations are called ab-initio.

Some of the explosives for which these calculations were made, can be used to compress radioactive material (implosion), in order to achieve the critical mass necessary for a nuclear explosion. Other materials are used for advanced rocket fuel.

Mr. Oftadeh apparently earns far more than the average Iranian salary. However, a scientist of his prominence and expertise could earn many times more abroad, if he channeled his knowledge in more positive directions.

This report will no doubt prevent Mr. Oftadeh from taking part in international conventions, and certainly will prevent him from entering Western countries, thus undermining his status in the international scientific community, and when the time comes, and he wants to change direction and make a living abroad, his deep involvement in the secret nuclear project will be taken into account (if he survives that long!).

If you want to verify these facts, here are Mr. Oftadehs’ contact details.

Get in touch with him and check for yourself.

His address is: Golestan ave. kosar st. 22 bahman st. Esfahan Iran

Reza Qassami

Dear UCF readers – and especially those working there – we have written at length about the UCF in previous articles. We have dealt with the dark side of workers’ behavior, and particularly of the site management. We have seen how unsuitable people have been appointed to positions, based not on necessary qualifications, but rather on personal and family ties (and we will have more to say about this in the future…). We have seen how some of the workers at the facility, especially at the managerial level, exploit the organization’s resources for their personal gain (and obviously we will have more to say about other projects too…).

This sort of behavior mainly concerns ethics and correct public conduct – for which these people will also have to pay – but that is not what we are discussing today.

This time, we will focus on another side of some of the conduct of these scientists, who, along with openly working in Iran’s nuclear project, are involved in secret projects, aimed at advancing Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

These scientists will pay a heavier price than their colleagues who are involved in civilian nuclear projects, because of their involvement in undeclared secret projects that are not under any international supervision whatsoever.

One of the scientists who, as well as working in civilian projects, is also deeply involved in secret projects, is Reza Qassami.

Who Is Reza Qassami?

He is a mid-level worker at the UCF project. We will discuss his exploits at the behest of Solat Sana – which are enough in themselves to get him into trouble – on another occasion.
However, dear readers, that is not all there is to say about Qassami, and his activity at the UCF is minor compared to the following story.

A little bird told us that along with his other affairs, our good friend is also secretly involved in plutonium separation, which, as you know, leads in one direction only – a nuclear bomb.
The significance of this is clear to our dear readers, and we hope it is also clear to those involved in this field.

We therefore ask any of our dear readers who have further information on the man himself, the project, or other individuals involved in it, to send us this information as soon as possible!

Said Salimi

We have elaborated on the FMP project (Fuel Manufacturing Project) in the past, the purpose of which is to supply nuclear fuel to the reactor at Bushehr. We also wrote about the company’s director Mr. Qasem Tarazi, who in fact has absolutely no technical knowledge about the field he was placed in charge of, and thanks to his loyal employees, he manages to run the place. However, what we did not mention in the past is the fact that some of the FMP workers are former employees of the Pishgam company. One of these employees is Said Salimi.

A few facts about Pishgam
“The Company for the Development of Energy Industries – Pishgam” which was located at the nuclear center in Esfahan was involved in building projects such as: UCF, ZPP, FMP, etc. Today the company has been divided into several smaller companies called: Motasa – engineering company for the production of nuclear power stations, and Mosana – nuclear fuel production engineering. These companies report directly to Aghazadeh.

Who is Said Salimi?
1982-1987: studied at the Esfahan University for a BA degree in electronic engineering.
1988-1991: studied at the Amir Kabir university for a MA degree in Physics
1989-1993: worked at the nuclear center in Esfahan – ENTC
1993-2005: worked at Pishgam. Most of the time he worked at the Kashan site.
He was a control engineer at almost all of the places.
2006: Technological engineer at MKES
After that until 2007, he worked at the reactor in Arak and was transferred from there to the FMP.

According to his CV this is one of the veteran scientists who ‘received the honour’ of being involved in planning and setting up many projects and also to work on them. Due to his deep involvement in many projects he has gained much knowledge on what is happening in Iran’s nuclear project.

But it is a doubtful honour, since heavy and long ongoing involvement in advancing Iran’s nuclear project will surely place him on the dishonourable list of Iranian nuclear people on whom official international institutions have placed sanctions, and further steps are expected

Sayed Esmail Khalilipour Langroudi

Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) is one of the most important bodies in Iran’s non-conventional project. This organization, which consists of many divisions and managers and subsidiary companies, was included in the list of bodies on which the Security Council, the EU and the U.S. imposed international sanctions, and which the British and the Japanese define as “a source of concern regarding proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and SS-missiles”.

The AEOI is officially subordinate to the Leader and its director is Aghazadeh, who is considered one of his deputies. In practice, the AEOI is subject to the supervision of the Supreme National Security Council, and manages a budget of hundreds of millions of dollars.
The AEOI’s senior managers, some of whom we have presented here, for example Faqihian, are also subject to personal sanctions. This includes freezing their bank accounts and assets, and movement restrictions.

Today we will deal with another senior official in the organization – Sayed Esmail Khalilipour Langroudi.

“Doctor” Khalilipour, who until recently was head of the safety and radiation protection division, and whose name is also featured in the list, is an example of the AEOI’s typical incompetent and corrupt management.

Khalilipour was born in 1945. He holds a B.A. in chemistry and an M.A. in philosophy from an English university. Although he never completed his doctorate, the Iranian authorities “awarded” him this title because of his “devoted services”, mainly his good ties with the right people.

During the Shah’s era, he was involved in the laser isotope separation project. After the revolution he was responsible for manpower recruitment and training in the AEOI. In 1989, thanks to his close ties to Amrollahi, then AEOI head, he was appointed director of the TNRC (Tehran Nuclear Research Center), and a board member of the AEOI. At the same time, he was also responsible for certifying the religious devoutness of candidates for the AEOI and monitoring the religious devoutness of employees.

The “doctor’s” many roles did not prevent him from traveling abroad often, and in 1995 he was unexpectedly sent, together with his family, to Vienna as deputy head of the AEOI delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) there. This representation is extremely important and sensitive because it was responsible for the “Iranian nuclear file” in the IAEA, before it was transferred to the Security Council for handling. As we know, this move led to active measures against Iran, including imposing sanctions that harm not only the bodies and people involved in Iran’s nuclear and non-conventional program, but also the Iranian economy and, in particular, the people of Iran.

Was Khalilipour’s surprising appointment made because of his dismal performance as director of the TNRC, which was disorganized and inefficient? Or was it because of his close ties with important people in the AEOI? Or perhaps it was because he was a yes-man who could please his bosses and not interfere in their unprofessional and unscrupulous behavior?

Indeed, this does not surprise us!!! A mission abroad is a wonderful way to reward people whom you value – even if the position is totally redundant professionally, as in Khalilipour’s case, and costs the taxpayer much money.

That is not all! When he returned to Iran in 1999 from his assignment in Vienna, Khalilipour was appointed to his current position in a glorious AEOI career: head of the safety and radiation protection division!! Khalilipour is responsible for the safety in Iran’s nuclear installations. Speaking about safety in the Bushehr reactor, he said that ultimately, it was the Russians and the IAEA experts who were responsible for the reactor’s safety. We want to remind you all that the Russians were the people who built the Chernobyl reactor, and it is the IAEA experts that Iran is deceiving and from whom it is systematically concealing its real non-conventional activity.

It is ironic that the person chosen to be responsible for the personal safety of each and every one of us, and for the environment that could be irreversibly damaged by negligently built and operated nuclear installations, is someone with a meager and inadequate personal and professional record. The reason is clear – Khalilipour is known to be easy-going and spineless, and that he can be relied upon to not meddle in the AEOI’s and the regime’s nefarious management practices. These include deviations from the safety regulations laid down by the IAEA and the AEOI itself by lax control, if any, in Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Are personal connections and unconditional loyalty to ruling interests the key to professional and financial success and promotion? Well, that is the way it is in Iran – and the end justifies the means!

That a man with mediocre educational, professional, management and personal skills, such as Khalilipour, is able to rise to a key position in the AEOI - someone, on the face of it, who is a symbol and role model for professional and personal excellence – should be a warning sign to all of us about the AEOI’s overall management.

It is imperative for every single citizen in Iran, and certainly for every scientist and academic and expert in their field, to think carefully before joining corrupt and incompetent government bodies managed by mediocre and short-sighted people such as Khalilipour and his gang.
The harm to those who have already chosen, or who will choose, to do this will not be confined merely to impairing their professional and personal development. It will mark them as serving an organization defined as dangerous and lawbreaking, and all it implies.

Shahin Naghavi

Iran’s nuclear industry is drawing in serious professionals, with advanced degrees in chemistry, physics, mathematics, electrical engineering, and others. These people believe that by joining Iran’s nuclear industry disposition they are becoming part of a professional, organized system, which works according to correct work standards, devoid of corruption and nepotism, in order to further Iran’s national objectives.

One such person is Seyed Shahin Naghavi, a young chemical engineer, married and father to young children, who is employed at one of Iran’s most sensitive and important security sites, the uranium conversion facility (UCF), which is a wide-scale project for converting the uranium compounds needed for the nuclear fuel cycle. The site is located in the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), and is managed by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

Shahin Naghavi filled one of the most sensitive posts in the project between 2000 and 2004 – a period characterized by significant and impressive progress in site construction – including completing setting up the key production line buildings at the UCF, and establishing procurement ties for equipment that Iran cannot produce indigenously. During and following this period, Naghavi held a senior post which afforded him access to extensive information on all activities and developments at the site, including producing the reports sent to the president of the AEOI and to senior regime officials on the rate of progress on the various assemblies in the project, and work faults and failures, etc.

We have previously exposed information on the true goings-on in the “back-rooms” of this and other projects (such as ZPP – in charge of producing the zirconium cladding for the fuel rods in the Arak reactors, managed by the AEOI). Those who know this organization are aware that all of the senior officials dealing with the organization’s nuclear projects have placed family members and friends – with no commercial, scientific, or technical experience – in senior positions. The organization’s president, Aghazadeh, who has no professional assessment skills, passes the reports, which do not reflect reality, to the country’s leaders. Furthermore, the AEOI prevents disclosure of the true picture through bribes, favors, and gratuities to the directors of various companies that are linked to the nuclear projects.

We have no doubt that Mr. Naghavi, who previously worked at JHL, the laboratories of Jaber Ibn Khayan (the AEOI research laboratories) is aware of the true state of affairs at the project, despite the “smoke-screen” with which senior regime members are trying to obscure Iran’s actual progress in the nuclear field, as part of its negotiating tactics with the IAEA, the Security Council, and the P5+1. Added to this is the fact that he is a young man at the start of his professional career, whose hobbies (film, sport, treks, learning English, and deepening his knowledge of chemical engineering) are evidence that he is an educated young man with broad horizons.

This combination has led, apparently, to the fact that Shahin Naghavi, a man at the very heart of Iran’s sensitive nuclear industry, understands that he and his family have no future in his country, and he is trying to find a country of refuge for him and his family to emigrate to, with Canada as his first choice!

Shahin is not the only one who is aware of what the senior wheelers and dealers of Iran, scientists and politicians alike, are trying to hide and disguise. We know that many of them, disappointed with how these corrupt and unprofessional systems conduct themselves, are trying to find themselves a way out, preferably through immigration to Western countries where they are welcomed with open arms, in recognition of their talents and professional experience. Their objective – if they cannot help and advance their country – is to save themselves and their families at least.

If you also have information on the improper conduct of those in Iran’s nuclear industries, we invite you to share your details with us, and we will help expose it, in the hope that this will shock those in charge of running the country, and lead to an in-depth investigation of the organizations and bodies involved.

Shokoufeh Vakilinia

As you know, the UCF is a huge facility established for converting uranium compounds required for the nuclear fuel cycle. The site, which includes several of Iran’s most sensitive and important security facilities, is located close to the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) and is managed by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

This time we will discuss a young woman, Shokoufeh Vakilinia, born on the 21st of September 1979, married with no children, who has an MSc in mining chemistry from the chemical mining engineering faculty of Sahand University of Technology, Tabriz.

Her email address is svakilinia@gmail.com.

Mrs. Vakilinia is probably aware of the risks inherent in working at a facility related to the nuclear industry, and its negative implications for her personal future (such as the connection between fertility and working with radioactive materials), and her academic and professional future. She has therefore chosen, like her colleagues working with her, to conceal the fact that she is working there and to present herself as an “industrial chemist”.

Any of our faithful readers who have further details about Mrs. Vakilinia, or her picture, or information about her scientific colleagues who are assisting Iran’s nuclear industry, are invited to contact us.

We will verify the information and publish it

Yadollah Saboohi

We are referring to Professor Yadollah Saboohi, who is now head of the FMP laboratories.

He received his bachelors degree from Queen Mary University in London.

He received his masters degree from London University.

He finished his doctorate at Stuttgart University in Germany in 1989.

Yadollah Saboohi was a member of the Strategic Research Center, which is actually a sub-committee of the National Security Committee. In 2004, he headed a team of scientists who studied uranium oxide pellets for fuel production. The research was conducted at the UCF in Esfahan.

Prof. Saboohi managed the establishment of the FMP (as we mentioned in the past, the FMP was designed by Pishgam Company).

He wrote many scientific articles in partnership with other scientists, among them Hossein Ghadimian. Most of these articles were about various aspects of energy.
Today he also lectures at Sharif University.

The FMP project is known to be subject to production difficulties. This is probably because of the low standard of engineers working in the project, so they do not succeed in overcoming the production problems.

The existence of problems, as mentioned, in the facility, raises doubts about what is being done in the project in particular, and in the Atomic Energy Organization in general:
Isn’t the presence of a scientist of his stature supposed to solve problems in the facility?
Is it justified that a scientist of his stature should be marginalized in a mediocre job such as laboratory manager?

Is this not another example of poor management in the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran regarding the appointment of friends for jobs etc., which we mentioned in the past regarding Qassem Tarzi’s appointment as FMP director?

With such problems in the project, has the time not come to replace the head, that is, Mr. Tarzi?

Professor Saboohi’s telephone number and e-mail address:
Tel: 98-21-66036096
Fax: 98-21-66013128
E-mail: saboohi@sharif.ir
saboohi@sharif.edu

For more information please see

http://anucleardisaster.blogspot.com

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